In this paper, I show that a sizable component of emerging market sovereign yield spreads is due to factors other than default risk such as liquidity. I estimate the non-default component of the yield spreads as the basis between the actual credit default swap (CDS) premium and the hypothetical CDS premium implied by emerging market bond yields. On average, the basis is large and positive for speculative grade bonds and slightly negative for investment grade bonds. Large positive basis for speculative grade bonds support the existence of speculation in the CDS market when the underling's credit quality is bad. I study the effects of bond liquidity, liquidity in the CDS market, equity market performance and macroeconomic variables on the non-default component of the emerging market yield spreads. I show that bond liquidity has a significant and positive effect on the CDS-bond basis of investment grade bonds. The results suggest that the liquid bonds of investment grade bonds are more expensive relative to the prices implied their CDS premiums. However, the results are somewhat mixed and even contrary for the speculative grade bond sample.
Introduction
Over the past 10 years, emerging market sovereign bonds handily outperformed not only U.S. corporate bonds, but the S&P 500 equity index as well. Emerging market bonds are a very large and fast growing asset class; their trade volume in the world is expected to approach $8 trillion in 2008. Since emerging market economies carry a considerable default risk, they offer a yield a significant spread relative to their riskless counterparts. However, not the entire yield spread of an emerging market bond can be explained by the default risk alone. Recent studies on the US corporate bond market have noted that factors such as liquidity, taxes, and aggregate market risk also play important roles in corporate yield spreads. Therefore, it is interesting to explain; to what extent sovereign bond yield spreads reflect default risk and how much of their spreads relative to their riskless counterparts stems from factors such as liquidity and other market risk factors.
A derivative instrument called Credit Default Swap (CDS) has become very popular in the last decade. Since CDS prices default risk explicitly, they are a considered as a good benchmark for the pure credit risk of the underlying entity. In this paper, I use CDS premiums to estimate the default and non-default component of emerging market sovereign bond yields and examine the link between the non-default component and liquidity. I study the difference between the CDS premium and the CDS premium as implied by the bond yields as a measure of the nondefault component of the bond yield. 3 I refer to the difference between the CDS premium and the implied CDS premium as the CDS-bond basis, and I relate the CDS-bond basis to bond liquidity, speculation in the CDS market, CDS liquidity, equity market performance and world macroeconomic factors.
My research has a number of significant contributions to both emerging market debt literature and to the literature on the non-default component of bond yields. First, to the best of my knowledge, this work is the first attempt to identify the non-default components of sovereign bond yield spreads. I use the data on US Dollar denominated bonds, which are issued by 21 emerging market countries and their CDS premiums between January 2004 and May 2008.
Second, I improve the literature on calculating the basis between actual CDS and implied CDS premiums by relaxing the restrictive assumption of a "flat term structure of credit curves". 4 ( Figure 1 and 2) Third, my results on the distribution of the basis, i.e. the non default component, suggest clues about the speculation in the CDS market. This paper is the first one to present evidence on the speculation in the CDS market. My results confirm a large positive basis for speculative grade bonds, which suggests that on average, the CDSs are more expensive than what is implied by their underlying bond yields. When the news about a sovereign is bad, speculators -without owning the underlying bond-might speculate on worsening of the credit conditions of the underlying asset by buying the CDS contract. The excess demand to CDSs would increase the CDS premium while bond prices do not fall as much since the speculation is not directly related to the risk premium of the underlying.
Fourth, I show that liquid bonds investment grade sovereigns are more expensive relative to the price implied by their CDS premiums. For speculative grade bond sample, the results suggest a mixed and even contrary relationship between the bond liquidity and the CDS basis. I use direct bond liquidity proxies such as bid-ask spreads and turnover ratios. I divide the bonds into two rating groups, as investment and speculative grade, in order to distinguish the effects of liquidity on bonds with different credit quality. I illustrate that liquidity has a significant positive effect on the CDS-bond basis of investment grade bonds. Nevertheless, liquidity has a mixed and even contrary effects on the CDS-bond basis of speculative grade bonds. Some possible reasons include; limits to arbitrage due difficulty of short selling the bond and speculation in the CDS market. These are dealt with deeply throughout the paper.
As a novelty for this literature, I report that the domestic stock market performance of emerging markets have a significant negative impact on non-default component of bond yields.
The reason for the negative effect seems to be related to credit risk and to the lead-lag relationship between the CDS and bond markets. 5 The important thing to note is that the focus of this research is emerging market sovereign bond yield spreads. There are some main differences between the US corporate bond market and emerging market sovereign bond markets. These main differences include: Emerging market sovereigns use only bond financing. By providing large issue sizes and longer maturities in different currencies, they are among the world's largest actors in fixed income markets. The credit event in their CDS contracts is defined differently from those of corporate borrowers since they do not enter directly into the asset liquidation process; instead they rely on debt restructuring processes. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review; Section 3 describes the data source and sampling schemes; Section 4 shows the methodology of calculation for the implied CDS premium and the CDS-bond basis; Section 5 discusses the results of my study showing the effects of bond liquidity, CDS liquidity, equity market performances, macroeconomic variables on the non-default component; and finally, Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
Early researches have studied the determinants of US corporate yield spreads. On the emerging market literature side, a number of articles have also focused on the determinants of yield spreads. 6 Some important papers on the determinants of US corporate yield spreads include Jones & Rosenfeld (1984) , Longstaff & Schwartz (1995) , Duffie D. (1999) , Elton, Gruber, Mann, & Mann (2001) , Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & Spencer (2001) and Liu, Longstaff, & Mandell (2006) However, these studies were unable to explain a significant component of the yield spreads, which is not attributable to default risk alone. Longstaff, Mithal, & Neis (2005) and later Nashikkar et. al. (2007) , Han & Zhou (2008) , Ericsson and Reneby, & Wang (2007) (2005) and Nashikkar et. al. (2007) is that they assume a flat term structure of credit risk curves.
However, the term structure of credit curves is far from being flat. My paper contributes to this literature on identifying and analyzing the determinants of non-default component of yields spreads by examining this relationship in the emerging market debt for the first time. I improve the literature on calculating the basis between actual CDS and implied CDS premiums by relaxing the restrictive assumption of "flat term structure of credit curves" by making full use of CDS maturities from 1 to 10 years. Blanco et al. (2005) and Zhu H. (2006) document on the co-integration relationship between the corporate bond spreads and CDS premiums. They argue that in the short run, the CDS market leads the corporate bond market in the price discovery process. Zhu, H. (2006) further argues that the short run deviation in is largely due to different responses of the two markets to changes in credit conditions.
The literature on the emerging market bond yield spreads and CDS market is limited. Even though none of the articles are directly related to my research, I present a very brief literature review on the sovereign CDS market. Pan and Singleton (2006) , using the CDS pricing model suggested by Duffie and Singleton (2003) , show an effort to distinguish between the default risk and the recovery risk in CDS premiums. Chan-Lau and Kim (2004) analyse the co-integration relationship between emerging market CDS premiums and the Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI), which is an index covering U.S. Dollar-denominated Brady bonds, loans and Eurobonds. Ammer and Cai (2007) also analyze a co-integration relationship between bond yields and CDS premiums, and report the possibility of the significant impact of cheapest to deliver optionality in CDS premiums. Duffie (1999) shows that under certain conditions, there is an equivalence relationship between CDS premiums and yield spreads on a floating par bond with the same credit risk and maturity. However, since most emerging market bonds are straight fixed-rate, this equivalence does not hold precisely in practice. Therefore, searching for a price discovery relationship between the CDS premiums and the EMBI index or similar indices would result in biased conclusions.
Data Description and Sampling
My bond data source is ISMA (the International Securities Market Association), which is the (Huang and Huang, (2003) ). The main disadvantage of this approach is that these models are very sensitive to model selection on both default process and risk premium. Considering default events occur at a much smaller frequency in sovereign markets, it becomes even more difficult to estimate the default component by relying on calibration with historical data.
On the other hand, the existence of an efficient and liquid CDS market allows us to isolate default risk in bonds issued by a certain issuer without relying too much on a particular model selection or historical data, since a direct market pricing of credit risk is available in the CDS market.
In fact, Duffie (1999) showed that under certain conditions there is an equivalence relationship between CDS premiums and yield spreads on a floating-rate par bond with the same credit risk. Since most emerging market bonds are fixed-rate bonds, the equivalence suggested by Duffie (1999) does not hold precisely in practice. Longstaff et al. (2005) showed that the basis between the pure corporate bond spread and CDS is a biased measure of the non-default component.
Another factor complicating the above equivalence relationship stems from the delivery of the reference obligation in the case of a default. In the case of a default, the buyer of the insurance has to deliver an eligible bond to the protection seller in order to get the face value of the bond.
Obviously, this deliverable bond will be the cheapest among all deliverable bonds. Moreover, if the deliverable bonds are illiquid, the buyer of the CDS protection may bear additional costs to obtain the bond.
One CDS based approach used to determine default and non-default components of corporate bonds is to use the difference between the CDS premium and the corporate bond yield as a proxy for the non-default component. Han and Zhou (2008) take this approach one step further. They add swap rates to CDS premiums to estimate a CDS-implied par yield curve, and use this curve to bootstrap the zero yield curves and discount the cash flows of each bond to obtain a CDSimplied bond price. They call the difference between actual and CDS-implied bond prices as the basis, i.e. non-default component. However this approach may lead to errors, because the above relationship between CDS premiums and par yields holds only for floating-rate par yield bonds.
Considering most of the emerging market bonds have high fixed coupon rates, the majority of the time they sell at a premium. However, CDS protects only up to a bond's face value. So, discounting bonds' cash flows with a zero curve obtained by CDS premiums will most probably be biased. Longstaff et al. (2005) used a credit risk model to price the CDS and corporate bonds. While this approach addresses the problems of bonds selling at par or discount, it is heavily modeldependent. The literature on credit risk models demonstrates that there remain significant pricing errors in all the models that have been used so far (Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam and Mahanti (2007) ).
This paper follows the market participants and uses a method called par-equivalent CDS spread of the bond in order to isolate the non-default component of the bond yields. The problem of deviations of the bond price from its par value is addressed in this method. Since this model does not require any explicit calibration of a credit risk model, it is model independent. In the related paper by Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam, Mahanti (2007) , although the authors used a similar method to isolate the non-default component of yield spreads on corporate bonds, they assumed a flat term structure of credit curves. Due to poor CDS maturity diversity, they use only 5 year CDS premium data, although their bond sample included bonds maturing from 1 month to 40 years. This assumption leads to a major error. As the Mexico example in Figure 1 shows, the term structure of credit risk is far from being flat for emerging markets; rather, its slope is steeply positive. The assumption of flat term structure will lead to biased results of the basis for the bonds with maturities not equal to 5 years. For instance, think about a bond with a maturity of 10 years and a steep upward sloping credit curve. In this case, calculating the 5-year hypothetical par-equivalent CDS spread using the default rates extracted from a 10-year bond assuming constant default rates will cause result in upwards biased hypothetical 5-year CDS premiums. As a result, the basis between the actual 5 year CDS and the par-equivalent CDS premiums will be downwards biased, which will cause errors when measuring the effects of liquidity.
My methodology of isolating the non-default component allows for non-flat credit curve term structures. The details of the methodology of par-equivalent CDS premium and CDS-bond basis is provided in the following section. The methodology to compute the basis is briefly as follows:
First, I back out the average probability of default from the market prices of bonds, using swap rates as a risk free curve. Second, using this average probability of default, I compute the expected payoffs of the protection buyer and seller in a hypothetical CDS contract, which has the same maturity as the corresponding bond's remaining maturity. By applying no arbitrage condition, the CDS premium, which makes the expected payoffs of protection buyer and seller equal, is my hypothetical par equivalent CDS premium.
The important virtue of this hypothetical CDS contract is that it has the same maturity of the corresponding bond from which the default probabilities are extracted. Since all emerging market countries in my data sample have CDS dates of maturity from 1 to 10 years, I am able to control for the non-flat term structure of credit curves. The basis for a specific bond is then computed as follows:
where i∈ (0,10] is the maturity of the corresponding bond. is the market premium of a CDS contract with a maturity of i years. is the implied CDS premium, which is computed by extracting the default probabilities from a bond maturing in i years. Actual CDS premiums for intermediate dates are found by linear interpolation.
Considering the above definition, without liquidity risk, when the basis is negative an arbitrage strategy would involve buying the bond and the CDS together with the same maturity.
In this way, credit risk is hedged and the basis, i.e. non default component, is earned. This arbitrage strategy is feasible when the bond market is liquid. When the basis is positive, the arbitrage strategy would sell the CDS protection and short sell the corresponding bond. As argued in Duffie (1999) and Duffie et al. (2002b) and Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam, Mahanti (2007) , shorting a bond is costly because it is difficult to find it in the securities borrowing and lending market. If the bond is illiquid, then shorting that bond will be even more costly.
Pricing of Risky and Risk-free Bonds and Extracting the Probability of Default
The price of a defaultable bond today P 0 is obtained as the sum of (risk-neutral) expected discounted cash flows. 7
If the bond defaults at time , the following cash-flows are zero, When valuing a risk-free bond, one does not need the expectation operator, since the cash flows are certain. The price of a risk-free bond is then given:
Note that, the difference between the prices of a risk-free bond and a risky bond, both having the same promising cash flows, is equal to the discounted expected loss from holding the risky bond. Therefore we can generalize this relationship for coupon bonds as:
The assumptions and the properties in above formula are :
:
Default is assumed to occur at coupon dates, which are semiannually in US dollar denominated emerging market bonds. P 0 : Is the observed market price of the emerging market bond.
The price of the risk-free bond with the same cash flows as the risky bond. It is found by discounting the cash flows of risky bond by the risk-free spot rate implied by Libor swap rates.
Is the risk-neutral probability of default as seen from time 0. In my analysis I assume the probability of default is step wise constant.
: This is the price of the risk-free bond that is expected to prevail at date It is found by using the implied forward rates.
It is the claim that a bondholder has in case of a default.
R:
R is known as the recovery rate. It is the percentage of the claim that bondholders receive in case of a default.
r: r represents the spot rates used to discount the cash flows. In this paper, Libor swap rates are used as risk-free spot rates.
Note that in equation (3), is the forward price of the riskless bond. Then, ( ) is simply the forward price of a riskless bond discounted by risk-free rate. A discounted forward price from time is nothing but today's present value of the payments from time onwards. Then, we can rewrite (3) as:
where is the price of the riskless bond at time discounted to today's value. Finally, we can solve for PD assuming it is step-wise constant.
The Hypothetical CDS Premium Implied by the Probability of Default and Maturity of a Risky Bond:
In a CDS contract, the protection buyer pays a fee in regular intervals until the contract expires or a credit event occurs. Upon a default, the protection buyer receives the difference between the face value and the recovery value of the defaulted bonds.
T is the life of the CDS contract. T is taken as the life of the corresponding risky bond, from which the probability of default, PD, is extracted. If p denotes the annual CDS fee percentage paid to the protection seller, then the expected fee is:
The expected gain of the protection buyer is then:
Where, A(t) is the accrued interest as a percentage of the notional principal, F is the face value of the reference bond and f is the frequency of premium payment in a year.. Therefore in a CDS contract, by no-arbitrage argument, one would expect p, the CDS premium, to be such that expected gains from buying the protection is equal to expected fees paid for the protection. Equating (5) and (6) we get:
p is then the hypothetical T year CDS contract implied by the probability of a default of the corresponding emerging market sovereign US dollar denominated straight, fixed coupon bond maturing exactly in T years. Finally, the CDS-bond basis is defined by the difference between the actual CDS premium and the above hypothetical CDS spread where their life equals the remaining maturity of the underlying bond.
where i∈ (0,10] is the maturity of the corresponding bond. is the market premium of a CDS contract with a maturity of i years. is the implied par-equivalent CDS premium, which is computed by extracting the default probabilities from a bond maturing in i years. Figure 2 is presented as an illustration of the calculated hypothetical par-equivalent CDS premium and resulting basis for one of Mexico's international bonds issued in 2003 and maturing in 2014. for the speculative bond basis shows a high degree of right skewness. In other words, the basis tends to be positive for the bonds issued by speculative grade emerging markets. On the other hand, for the investment grade sample, the distribution is more symmetric and even skewed a little bit to the left, causing a negative mean of the basis.
Distribution of CDS-Par equivalent bond yield Basis and Bond Specific Variables
These results suggest that the bonds of speculative grade emerging sovereigns are more expensive relative to their CDS contracts. However on the investment grade emerging markets side, the bond prices and the CDS premiums are more balanced, and in some cases CDS premiums are cheaper relative to their bonds. The situation for speculative grade emerging markets brings arbitrage opportunities to mind. An arbitrage strategy for positive basis would involve selling the CDS contract and short selling the bond. Shorting emerging market bonds is costly. Moreover, the cost is likely to peak just prior to default, since the demand from those who intend to deliver the bonds to the protection seller would exceed the supply. It is important to note that speculative grade sovereign issuers carry a very significant amount of credit risk.
Therefore, arbitrage of the positive basis of bonds by speculative grade sovereigns carries much friction, which justifies the right skewness of the basis distribution for speculative grade issuers.
Another reason for a large positive basis in the speculative grade bonds might be the speculative buys on CDSs written on bad credit quality bonds. When the news about a sovereign is bad, speculators, without owning the underlying bond, might speculate on the just by buying the CDS contract and waiting. The speculation could be either by betting on the occurrence of a credit event such as default or widening of the CDS premium. In either case, if the credit quality of the underlying worsens, the speculator would lock in a positive profit. The excess demand to CDSs would increase the CDS premium while bond prices do not fall as much as the speculation is not directly related to the risk premium of the underlying.
The above frictions are expected to be smaller in size and number for the investment grade emerging bond market. My results in Figure 3 for investment grade bonds support this hypothesis. It is seen that the mean of the basis is negative for investment grade bonds, meaning their bonds are cheaper relative to their credit risk implied by CDS contracts. Due to absence of short-sale constraints and its unfunded nature, the CDS market is thought to be more liquid compared to the bond market. Therefore it is natural to think of liquidity premiums included in the prices of investment grade bonds, which would cause bond yield spreads to be higher relative to CDS premiums, resulting in a negative basis. This main hypothesis is analyzed in the following sections.
The distribution of bond characteristics is presented in Figure 4 . One would find the distribution of age, remaining maturity and issue amount of the bonds at the beginning of a regression sample period.
Bond and Credit Default Swap Liquidity Variables
The first bond market proxy is the average percentage bid-ask spread of the emerging market sovereign bonds. The bid-ask spread for each bond is calculated by taking the time series average of the daily bid-ask spread reported by Datastream. The second liquidity proxy is the average daily volume for the previous month. It is calculated by taking the total nominal turnover for an individual bond in the previous month and dividing it by the number of working days in the month. The third proxy is the notional amount outstanding for each bond. The amount outstanding is used to measure general availability of the bond in the market. The fourth proxy is the age of the bond. This proxy is similar to the notion of on-the-run and off-the-run bonds in Treasury markets. There is extensive evidence that on-the-run Treasury bonds are much more liquid than off-the-run Treasury bonds. If there is a similar effect in the emerging bond market, then older bonds may be less liquid than more-recently issued bonds (Longstaff et al. (2005) ).The fifth proxy is the time to maturity of the bond. In the emerging market debt market there might be a high level of maturity clientele portfolio behavior, which may cause shorter maturity bonds to be more liquid. Moreover, academic literature reports that high coupon bonds tend to be more liquid than bonds with lower coupon bonds.
When the basis is negative, an arbitrage strategy involves buying the credit default swap protection and holding the bond until its maturity. However for an arbitrageur to benefit from the negative basis, CDS market liquidity is relevant as well. For hedging of a long position on a bond, the demand for bonds with higher liquidity in their CDS markets is expected to be higher.
Therefore, one should also take into consideration the CDS market liquidity. In order to analyse this issue, I include the daily CDS bid-ask spread and the daily percentage CDS bid-ask spread to its mid-value as proxies for the liquidity in the CDS market, and relate these variables to the CDS-bond basis.
Results

Correlations among liquidity variables:
To check the consistency of the liquidity variables, Table 4 presents the correlations between bond and CDS market liquidity variables. The theory on liquidity suggests that while bond liquidity is negatively associated to bid-ask spread and the bond's age, it is positively correlated to the turnover rate, coupon rate and issue amount.
My findings suggest a negative correlation between bid-ask percentage and turnover rate, issue amount and coupon rate for all the rating groups. These results are consistent with the literature on bond liquidity.
The correlation between bond market liquidity and CDS market liquidity is also examined. If we assume that increasing bid-ask spread and/or bid-ask percentage spread in CDS market represents its illiquidity, the signs of the correlation coefficients in Table 4 would allow for the existence a positive relationship between CDS and bond market liquidity.
Determinants of Bond Illiquidity:
In Table 5 Regressions also search for the effects worldwide macroeconomic variables such as US 6month T-bill and US term spreads between 6-month and 10-year T-bill yields on bond illiquidity.
My results indicate that an increase in the 6-month T-bill rate or term spread is associated with an increase in the illiquidity of the bond markets. This can be either because an increase in the US treasury yields reduces the demand for emerging market bonds, or because the world economy gets hit by a negative shock, which may increase instability in the emerging market economies.
Determinants of CDS-Bond Basis:
In order to asses the determinants of the CDS-bond basis, I use unbalanced panel regressions of the CDS-bond basis on various bond market liquidity variables, CDS market liquidity variables, corresponding issuer equity market indices and worldwide macroeconomic variables. Thirty-day averages of variables are taken to run this pooled regression. Regressions are run for three different rating groups in order to analyze possible differences between different credit risk groups. Data for bond, CDS, equity market and world macroeconomic indicators collected from Datastream allow me to reach a sample size of, at most, 90,000 data points for each variable.
As discussed in Petersen (2008) , in the financial data sets the residuals may be correlated across firms or across time, and OLS standard errors can be biased. Petersen (2008) shows that the standard errors clustered by firm are unbiased and produce correctly-sized confidence intervals independently on the firm effect to be permanent or temporary. Extending the literature on corporate finance data to emerging bond market data, I cluster the standard errors by each bond. Therefore, I assume the standard errors are correlated among each bond group.
Emerging Market Bond Liquidity
To check the individual effects of each bond liquidity variable on the CDS-par equivalent bond basis, I first run univariate regressions for different rating groups. Since the CDS market is expected to be more liquid compared to the bond market, one would expect the bond prices to bear a liquidity premium. My hypothesis is that the liquid bonds of investment grade emerging markets should be more expensive in the cross section, which would be indicated by a positive relationship between the CDS-bond basis and liquidity. As mentioned in section 3.2, the relationship between liquidity and the basis might even be inverse for speculative bonds, i.e. illiquid bonds of speculative grade emerging markets might be more expensive.
Consistent with the above hypothesis, the bid-ask spread, turnover by volume and coupon variables have the expected signs, and their magnitudes are significant for investment grade and pooled samples. For speculative grade bonds however, the bid-ask percentage variable has a positive sign and is statistically significant at a 95% significance level, which signals a positive impact of bond illiquidity on risky bond prices.
In Table 7 , the first column of regressions presents the results of the panel regressions of the monthly average CDS-bond basis to monthly averages of bond price bid-ask spreads, bond turnover rates by volume and other bond specific liquidity variables. As mentioned in the previous section, t-statistics are robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered by each bond.
I find a significant correlation between almost all bond market liquidity variables and investment grade emerging market bonds. All the variables except bond issue size have the expected signs. Results show that bond bid-ask spread, bond age and ratings have negative impact on basis. As argued before, bond age and bid-ask spreads are associated with illiquidity in the bond market. As the bond market becomes more illiquid, i.e. an increase in the bid-ask spread, one would expect the liquidity premium to be included in the emerging market bond yields, which would increase the bond yields and reduce the CDS-bond basis. My results show that a one percent increase in the bond bid-ask spread decreases the basis by fourteen basis points, which shows that the bid-ask spread variable is economically significant as well.
Since turnover rate by volume and coupon rate are expected to positively affect bond market liquidity, their signs are expected to be the opposite of bid-ask spread and bond age. This is in fact the case. My results show that the non-default component, i.e. the basis, of the liquid investment grade bonds tend to be smaller; in other words, ceteris paribus, liquid bonds tend to be more expensive in the cross section.
Unlike the corporate debt market, emerging market sovereign debt relies mostly on debt issued in the form of bonds. Countries with high debt need to acquire more debt by issuing larger bonds. So, the issue size of the bonds might have misleading results for our purposes. While bonds may become more liquid as the issue size increases, the credit quality may decrease at the same time, which would explain why the issue size variable has a negative sign.
The effect of the bond market liquidity of speculative grade emerging markets on the nondefault component of their yield spreads is ambiguous. The bid-ask spread, turnover by volume and issue amount variables have contradictory signs and insignificant t-statistics. Liquidity of speculative grade emerging market countries does not have much correspondence to the nondefault component of the yield spreads. Moreover the signs of the variables suggest that illiquidity (liquidity) in the bond market increases (decreases) the basis, which would mean that illiquid bonds of speculative grade emerging market countries might be more expensive relative to their liquid counterparts. In a CDS contract in the case of a credit event, the protection buyer has to provide the underlying bond to the protection seller to get the face value of the bond.
When the bond market is illiquid, in the case of a default it might be difficult to find the underlying bond in the market to provide to the CDS seller. This could explain why when credit quality is low (speculative grade bonds), illiquid bonds might become more expensive.
The results on remaining maturity are consistent with the previous studies suggesting that a large fraction of yield spreads, especially at the long end of the maturity range, cannot be solely explained by credit risk (Longstaff et al. (2005) ). Table 10 shows the results of unbalanced panel regressions of the par-equivalent basis on various bond liquidity variables, MSCI equity market indices and ratings controlling for country fixed effects. As can be seen from the table, the results show the impact of bond liquidity on the CDS-bond basis is robust for country fixed effects.
Emerging Market CDS Market Liquidity
The results in the Table 7 report that liquidity in the CDS market has significant effects on the non-default component over the bond liquidity variables. A one basis point increase in the CDS bid-ask spread leads to a increase in basis of 1 basis points in the overall pooled bonds, two basis points in the investment grade bond basis and one basis point in the speculative grade bonds. In other words, if one assumes level bid-ask spread as a proxy for CDS market illiquidity, bonds with higher illiquidity in their CDS market are more expensive in the cross section.
The above result might stem from two reasons (Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam and Mahanti (2007) ). First, less liquidity in the CDS market is likely to drive investors towards the bond market, causing the bonds` prices to increase. The correlations between the turnover by volume and CDS bid-ask spreads in Table 4 provides some counter support for this explanation. One might note the negative correlation between CDS bid-ask spread and turnover by volume. This means that when CDS illiquidity is high, the trade volume is low, which is the opposite of the above explanation. The second explanation states that episodes of illiquidity in the CDS market are often associated to negative news about the issuers on whom the CDS contracts are traded. It is generally difficult to short bonds, which leads to bonds becoming more expensive relative to their CDS contracts especially during the illiquid periods in the market.
The CDS bid-ask as a percentage has also positive sign and it is significant for speculative grade bonds and in pooled bonds. For investment grade bonds however the sign is negative.
Assuming a percentage bid-ask spread as a proxy for illiquidity, the investment grade bonds with liquid CDS market have higher prices in the cross section. The problem of whether assuming bid-ask spread or bid-ask percentage spread as representing illiquidity in the CDS market is not easy. Both measures are subject to be affected by the level of the CDS premium. Taking the ratio of the bid-ask spread might reduce the explanatory power of the bid-ask spread variable. On the other hand there is a high correlation between CDS premium and CDS bid-ask spread, which makes level bid-ask spread a biased proxy for illiquidity in the CDS market. The interesting fact here is that, CDS liquidity variables have significant effects on the non-default component of bond yield spreads even when bond market variables are in the regression. This provides evidence of a liquidity spill-over effects from the CDS market into the bond market (Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam and Mahanti (2007) ).
Equity Markets
In addition to bond market and CDS market liquidity, equity market performance of emerging markets has explanatory power for the non-default component of bond yields. The effect of equity markets has not been documented in this literature before. In order to analyse the possible effects of equity markets on bond yields, the MSCI index is used. The MSCI index was created by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) to measure equity market performance in global emerging markets.
As Table 8 shows, the MSCI index for each country's equity market has explanatory power over bond liquidity variables. According to my regression results, equity market performance has a negative impact on the non-default component. One reason for this would be equity market performance might be negatively correlated with an emerging market sovereign's credit risk. In other words, as the MSCI index increases, the credit risk and associated CDS premium should go down, which would reduce the basis (note that CDS-bond Basis =CDS actual -CDS implied ). In order to eliminate this possibility I include actual CDS premiums in the regression. Even though the robust t-statistics decrease, the MSCI index variable still has a significant and negative impact on the basis for overall sample and speculative bonds, while on investment grade bonds the same negative effect has no significance. The explanation for this result is in line with the findings of Blanco et al. (2005) and Zhu, H. (2006) where the authors analyze the co-integration relationship between bond yields and CDS premiums. They find that in the short run, the CDS market leads the corporate bond market in the price discovery process. Zhu, H. (2006) further argues that the short run deviation in is largely due to different responses of the two markets to changes in credit conditions. Since the equity market is more volatile in the short run, it is possible that CDS premiums internalize these equity market movements in its price earlier than the bond market; as a result, high equity market performance decreases both CDS premiums and their basis before the bond market reacts. I leave this lead-lag relationship for CDS and bond markets for future study. 
Effects of World-wide Macroeconomic Conditions
It has been shown that the credit risk on sovereigns depends highly on the world's macroeconomic conditions. For instance, Longstaff et al.(2007) argue that sovereign credit spreads are generally more related to the U.S. stock and high-yield bond markets, global risk premia, and capital flows than they are to their own local economic measures. Moreover they state that a significant amount of the variation in sovereign credit returns can be used to forecast using U.S. equity, volatility, and bond market risk premia.
I control for the credit risk of the sovereigns, to check whether macroeconomic conditions affect the yields only through the credit risk channel. I included the CDS premiums of the sovereigns in the regression to control explicitly for the credit risk and see whether world macroeconomic conditions have explanatory power over and above the credit risk of the sovereigns. As seen in 
Credit Risk and CDS-Bond Basis:
The impact of credit quality proxied by ratings is analyzed in Table 7 and Figure 3 . Table 7 , which reports the regressions of the CDS-bond basis on various liquidity variables and ratings, shows that ratings have a negative and significant impact on the CDS-bond basis. As ratings escalate from B1 to Aaa, the CDS-bond basis declines. Moreover, as presented in section 3.2, the average basis for investment grade bonds, i.e. ratings equal to or higher than Baa, is negative.
The hypothesis is that liquidity and the cost of short selling have important impacts on the CDS-bond basis. When short selling is feasible, one would expect higher liquidity is associated with higher bond prices, thus the higher basis. However, the opposite can be the case under high short selling costs. The results in Figure 3 and Table 7 together suggest the following. First, the average basis is positive for speculative grade bonds, and negative for investment grade bonds.
Second, as ratings increase the basis decreases and becomes negative for investment bonds. So, as credit risk increases, the CDS-bond basis increases, making the bonds more expensive relative to what would be implied by their CDS contracts. An arbitrage strategy for the positive basis would involve selling the CDS contract and short selling the bond. Shorting emerging market bonds is costly and this cost is likely to peak just prior to default, since the demand from those who intend to deliver the bonds to the protection seller would exceed the supply. Since speculative grade sovereigns carry a very significant amount of credit risk, positive basis arbitrage might be unfeasible.
Therefore, the illiquid bonds of highly risky sovereigns might be more expensive relative to their liquid counterparts. In Table 7 , illiquidity captured by bid-ask spread has a positive sign on the basis, and turnover by volume has a negative sign with insignificant t-statistics. These results for speculative grade bonds in Table 7 justify the hypothesis that with a considerable deterioration of credit quality the illiquid bonds may become more expensive.
The above effects of friction in the investment grade emerging bond market are expected to be smaller since short selling is easier with higher credit quality and liquidity. Due to the absence of short-sale constraints and its unfunded nature, the CDS market is thought of being more liquid compared to the bond market. Therefore, it is natural to think of liquidity premiums included in the prices of bonds of investment grade bonds, which would force bond yield spreads to be higher relative to CDS premiums and cause a negative basis. This main hypothesis is justified by the results in Figure 3 and Table 7 . First, the mean of the basis is negative for investment grade bonds; in other words, bond prices carry a liquidity premium and they are relatively cheaper compared to what is implied by their CDS premiums. Second, as ratings increase, the average CDS-bond basis decreases. Third, liquidity has a positive and significant impact on the basis for investment grade sovereign bonds and this effect carries through to the non-default component.
Conclusion
In When the news about a sovereign is bad, speculators, without owning the underlying bond, might speculate on worsening of the credit conditions of the underlying just by buying the CDS contract. This speculation could be either by betting on the occurrence of a credit event or widening of the CDS premium. The excess demand to CDSs would increase the CDS premium while bond prices do not fall as much since the speculation is not directly related to the risk premium of the underlying.
On the other hand, there are fewer frictional elements in the investment grade bond market.
The fact that the non-default components of investment grade bond yields are negative gives us a clue that bond prices might include liquidity premiums, since the CDS market is expected to be more liquid than the bond market due to the absence of short-sale constraints and its unfunded nature , I find significant the power of liquidity in explaining the non-default components of investment grade emerging market bonds. However, the effects of liquidity on speculative grade emerging market bonds are ambiguous or contrary to what I find for the investment grade bonds.
These results are in line with my initial hypothesis that investment grade emerging market bond prices include liquidity premiums. On the other hand, I expect normal shorting costs, peaking with worsening credit conditions, might render the illiquid bonds of risky speculative emerging market bonds more expensive. My results also confirm this hypothesis; liquidity has counter effects on non-default components with increasing credit risk.
As a novelty to this literature, I report that the domestic stock market performance of emerging markets has a significant negative impact on the non-default component of bond yields. The reason for the negative sign seems to be related to the credit risk and lead-lag relationship between the CDS and bond markets.
CDS liquidity measured as bid-ask spread and percentage bid-ask spread also has explanatory power for the basis over the bond liquidity variables. Since higher liquidity in the CDS market would mean easier hedging of a long position on a bond, it is natural to think of bond market participants taking CDS liquidity into account when pricing the emerging market bonds. A total of 107 US dollar denominated international bonds is issued by 21 emerging countries. The countries rated Baa3 and above are considered as investment grade while Ba1 and below are speculative grade. In the regression analysis, I number bonds with a B3 grade as 6. The numbers given to bonds increased with each rating to a maximum of 21, which corresponds to the rating Aaa. While 42 bonds are issued by investment grade emerging countries, the rest are issued by speculative grade emerging countries. Data is collected from Datastream and its validity is double checked with the data obtained from Bloomberg. Table 3 . The t-statistics reported in parentheses are robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered by bond. Data is obtained from Datastream. The purpose of this figure is to illustrate a common example of the term structure of credit curves of emerging market countries. As is clear from the credit curves, term structure of CDS is almost always positive. That is why it is extremely crucial to relax the "flat credit curve term structure" assumption. The CDS data is collected from Datastream, which distributes data from CMA. 
